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1. Introduction 
 
The question “What is Complexity?” has occupied a great deal of time and paper over the 
last 20 or so years. There are a myriad different perspectives and “definitions” [1, 2, 3] 
but still no consensus. But what does the question mean? What do we expect from 
addressing it? Many think of the goal as finding an intentional definition, whereby 
necessary and sufficient conditions are specified, according to which anything can be 
uniquely classified as complex or not. On the other hand, an extensional definition takes a 
more phenomenological approach, characterizing the set of complex systems by trying to 
name its members. The intentional route faces the difficulty of either being too restrictive 
or too general. For example, the notion of computational complexity [4] is 
mathematically quite rigorous but is too restrictive and, given that maximally complex 
things are random bit strings, certainly does not capture the intuitive notion of what 
complexity is. On the other hand, defining complex systems as having many degrees of 
freedom and non-linear interactions is completely vacuous given that, basically, 
everything is like that, from a salt crystal to a zebra or from a simple atom to the human 
brain. One cannot argue that these conditions are not necessary, but they are certainly not 
sufficient. However, they do indicate two features that we should be aware of – What are 
things made of? and, What are their interactions?  
 
The extensional definition runs into the problem of having to decide which systems are in 
the set of complex systems and which not. Unfortunately, there is a definite, subjective 
disciplinary bias in answering this question, a physicist and a biologist often having quite 
different perspectives. However, instead of trying to determine a precise boundary to the 
set of complex systems we can take a more pragmatic approach of starting off by listing 
some systems that “everyone” would agree are complex, and therefore in the set of 
complex systems, and others that “everyone” would agree are not complex, and therefore 
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not in the set. We can then try to determine what properties discriminate between what 
we have definitely put in the set and what we have definitely left out. In taking this 
approach it will be useful to also pose the complementary, question: What isn’t 
Complexity? For instance, complexity isn’t many degrees of freedom and non-linear 
interactions. If it were, then basically everything would be a complex system and it 
wouldn’t make any sense in trying to distinguish complexity as something different. 
  
 
2. An example of a Complex System – Human language 
 
As stated, instead of first making an a priori definition of complexity and complex 
system, we will take the path of first considering some systems that definitely would be 
accepted (at least by the vast majority) as being complex and compare them to some 
examples of systems that definitely would be accepted (at least by the vast majority) as 
being not complex. So, starting off with what is complex – two classes of system that 
immediately spring to mind, that certainly intuitively qualify as complex, are biological 
systems and human languages. We can think of the former as representing “physical” 
complexity and the latter “symbolic” complexity. Let us address first the question of 
human language.   
 
 
To be, or not to be--that is the question:  
Whether 'tis nobler in the mind to suffer  
The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune  
Or to take arms against a sea of troubles  
And by opposing end them. To die, to sleep--  
No more--and by a sleep to say we end  
The heartache, and the thousand natural shocks  
That flesh is heir to. 'Tis a consummation  
Devoutly to be wished. To die, to sleep--  
To sleep--perchance to dream: ay, there's the rub,  
For in that sleep of death what dreams may come  
When we have shuffled off this mortal coil,  
Must give us pause.  
 
Figure 1: Hamlet’s famous soliloquy from Shakespeare’s play of that name 
 
 
In Figure 1 we see an excerpt from Hamlet’s famous soliloquy in the Shakespeare play of 
the same name, while in Figures 2 and 3 we see two sequences extracted from a protein 
and the human genome respectively. There are several questions we can pose: are all 
three symbolic sequences complex? If so, is one more complex than the other? Naturally, 
our understanding of the text is greater - we speak the “lingo” – meaning that we 
understand both its grammatical and semantic content. 
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Figure 2: An amino acid sequence from a   
protein 
 
 
Imagine for a moment though, that Figure 1 is a mystery, as to a large extent are the 
others. We will analyze it from the point of view of a statistical physicist. What would 
probably strike one first, at least in the case of non-pictographic languages like English, is 
that there is a fundamental “microscopic” degree of freedom – the “letter” (by which we 
also include some other elementary symbols such as a space, number, punctuation marks 
etc.) and that language consists of an ordered sequence of such letters. The first question 
one might ask concerns the relative frequency of the different letters, <xi>, in a given 
sample of text, noting that these are highly non-random. For instance, in English, the 
vowels “a” and “e”, with frequencies of about 8% and 13% respectively, are much more 
common than consonants, such as “x” and “z”, which have frequencies of 0.15% and 
0.07%.  
 
What would we do next – look for correlations? Taking text as a linear ordered sequence, 
we can look for correlations between pairs of letters located at positions l and l’ in the 
sequence and evaluate the two-point correlation function <xi(l)xj(l’)>, which will be a 
function of (l-l’) only. What would we observe? In the case of l’ = l+1 we are considering 
digraphs; then, we would find, for instance, once again in English, that <t(l)h(l+1)> >> 
<q(l)z(l+1)> due to the fact that “h” often follows “t” but “z” does not follow “q”, “th” 
being the most common digraph in English. We’d also find that the correlations are non-
commutative, in that <xi(l)xj(l’)> ≠ <xj(l)xi(l’)>, e.g., “th” is much more common than 
“ht”. Proceeding, we could consider three-point functions, <xi(l)xj(l’)xk(l’’)>, finding for 
l’ = l +1 and l’’ = l + 2 that the trigraph “the” was the most frequent. What is more, we 
could observe that frequently the trigraph “the” has a space symbol on either side in the 
linear sequence, as had other combinations of letters.  
 
A perspicacious statistical physicist, with an insight into how effective degrees of 
freedom that describe collective behavior can emerge from combinations of underlying 
microscopic degrees of freedom, might be led to posit the existence of an effective degree 
Figure 3: A nucleotide sequence from 
the human genome 
 4 
of freedom of the type, “SPACE xi(l)xj(l+1)…xk (l+n) SPACE”, and might be led to call 
this new emergent degree of freedom a “word”. The most common word in English is 
“the” which comprises about 2% of all words in a typical text. Armed with this 
knowledge of the existence of a “bound state” of letters – the word – our inquisitive 
statistical physicist following the lead of an analysis of the relative frequency of different 
letters might be inclined to now think about the relative frequency of these words. In 
Figure 4 we see a plot in log-log coordinates of the frequency of a word versus its rank 
for Wikipedia web pages. Lo and behold, one finds a straight line signifying that the 
relation between word frequency as a function of frequency rank is a power law of the 
form f(r) =A/ra, where a=1 for r < rc, and rc ~ 10,000. This is the famous Zipf’s law [5].  
Interestingly, there appears to be a crossover at rc such that for r > rc f(r) = B/r2. This is all 
very exciting and surprising for our statistical physicist. The question is: does it tell us 
anything about language and its associated complexity? 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: A plot of word frequency in Wikipedia (November 27, 2006). The plot is in 
log-log coordinates. x  is rank of a word in the frequency table; y  is the total number of 
the word’s occurences. Most popular words are “the”, “of” and “and”, as expected. Zipf's 
law corresponds to the upper linear portion of the curve, roughly following the green 
(1/x) line (Victor Grishchenko) 
 
Now, all this analysis for text in natural language can also be carried out for the systems 
of Figures 2 and 3. In fact, many of the results are somewhat analogous. Genes, indeed, 
are somewhat analogous to words. Beyond that though, we really don’t have much 
understanding of the effective degrees of freedom of genetic systems. In fact, there is 
currently ample debate as to what degree a gene is an isolatable effective degree of 
freedom [6].  
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3. Bored on the “Edge of Chaos” 
 
 
Having seen the appearance of a power law and an associated scale invariance in the 
context of human languages our statistical physicist is reminded of what has been an 
important concept in the study of complexity - the “Edge of Chaos” [7, 8]. The idea is 
that complex systems, in analogy to the porridge of the three bears, are neither too 
“ordered” nor too “disordered” but finely balanced between the two. The original 
application of the “Edge of Chaos” idea was to the very interesting subject of information 
processing in cellular automata, where it was shown that, in order to promote “complex” 
computation, an adequate balance between information storage and information 
transmission was required; information transmission requiring a low entropy (low noise) 
regime while information storage, which required many available states, is associated 
with a high entropy regime.  
 
Another very interesting example of a balance between ordering and disordering 
tendencies is associated with the “error threshold” [9] in molecular evolution, where there 
can be a fine balance between mutation and selection. If the mutation rate is too high then 
selection cannot act, while if it is too low the system cannot easily evolve. There is, in 
fact, evidence that some viruses do operate with mutation rates near the error threshold 
[10] in order to strike a balance between exploration and exploitation. In these different 
examples, as in the case of word frequency and Zipf’s law, one encounters power laws 
characterizing the relationship between certain variables. These power laws are a 
consequence of the absence of a characteristic scale and the associated phenomenon of 
scale invariance.  
 
However, this idea of balancing order and disorder is an old one in statistical mechanics, 
being associated with the idea of a phase transition, especially a second order one, where 
physical quantities exhibit power law behavior, just like Zipf’s law, and the system 
displays “criticality”. For instance, the magnetization of a ferromagnet, φ, is related to the 
temperature deviation from the critical temperature, t = Tc–T, as βϕ t∝ , where β is a 
characteristic critical exponent. Near the critical temperature there is a fine balance 
between the disordering tendencies of thermal fluctuations and the ordering one due to 
the fact that the magnetic dipoles in the ferromagnet energetically prefer to be in an 
aligned state. In this case, the temperature has to be tuned quite delicately to be in the 
vicinity of the critical temperature in order to see scale-invariant power law-type 
behavior. This requirement of tuning is very common.  
 
There are systems, though, where the analog of the temperature tunes itself without 
external influence. These systems exhibit self-organized criticality, and the most famous 
example is that of a sand-pile [11]. One imagines slowly dropping sand grains onto a pile 
on a table. The pile eventually reaches the edge and a dynamic equilibrium is reached 
whereby the amount of sand arriving and the amount leaving are equal. In such 
circumstances the angle between the sides of the pile and the table is fixed. On the sides 
of the pile there take place avalanches of sand grains. The frequency, f, of such 
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avalanches depends on their size, n, such that α−∝ nnf )( .  Once again, we see the 
ubiquitous power law behavior characteristic of scale invariance. Similar results exist for 
earthquakes, species extinctions, fundamental laws of physics, such as electromagnetism 
and gravity, metabolic rates, city populations, income distribution, flying velocities of 
insects and stock prices, to name just a few!    
     
What are we to make of a phenomena that is so omni-present? Is it something very deep 
or very trivial? Of course, no one could deny that on a case by case basis all these 
phenomena are extremely interesting, but remember, we are here trying to find 
discriminating characteristics of complex systems. The ubiquity of power law behavior, 
applying equally to “simple” systems, such as ferromagnets and Newton’s universal law 
of gravitation, as to “complex” ones, such as cities’ populations and stock prices, puts the 
“Edge of Chaos” in its most general meaning in the same class as other characteristics, 
such as “many degrees of freedom” and “non-linear interactions”, vacuous as a means of 
saying what truly discriminates complex systems from simple ones. Thus, although the 
“Edge of Chaos” may be a characteristic of complex systems, it is not a defining 
characteristic, in that it does not discriminate between what is definitely complex and 
what is definitely not complex. 
 
I mentioned above that there are certainly disciplinary biases associated with 
considerations of what is complex and what not. This is also true for whether or not one 
thinks that scale invariant behavior is normal, or surprising, or not. For particle 
physicists, what is surprising is the existence of masses, i.e. preferred scales, rather than 
scale invariance. For a solid state physicist however, seeing scale invariant behavior near 
a second order phase transition seems more surprising in a system that possesses 
important fixed scales, such as the inter-atomic spacing in a crystal lattice.  
  
 
4. Structural Building Block Hierarchies 
 
 
So, not everything exhibits power law behavior. On the contrary, there are just as many 
instances of effective degrees of freedom that do have a characteristic scale – massive 
elementary particles, nucleons, nuclei, atoms, molecules and macromolecules, cell nuclei 
and other organelles, cells, tissues and organisms. For instance, there is no scale invariant 
distribution of elephant sizes, or number of nucleotides in the DNA of a given species. In 
particular, systems that manifestly exhibit physical complexity, such as biological 
organisms, are associated with a myriad of quite distinct characteristic scales, at each of 
which the characteristic effective degrees of freedom are radically different. What is 
more, such effective degrees of freedom exhibit a hierarchical relationship – loosely 
speaking, nucleons are composed of quarks, nuclei of nucleons, atoms of nuclei and 
electrons, molecules of atoms, cell nuclei and other organelles of biological 
macromolecules, cells of organelles, tissues of cells and organisms of tissues.  
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There is a very powerful, simple argument as to why nature should favor such 
hierarchical structures. If we try to construct a human by throwing atoms together we 
would be waiting a very long time. However, if we try to form molecules by throwing 
atoms together then that is much more feasible. Then, we can try and form polymeric 
macromolecules from encounters between their monomeric constituents, and so on. In 
other words, it is much easier to construct a more complex system via interactions 
between a not too large a number of slightly less complex potential “building blocks”, 
than from a very large number of very simple “building blocks”. One then develops a 
nested hierarchy of building blocks at different scales such that blocks at one scale are 
constituents for blocks at a larger scale, which in their turn etc. Nucleosynthesis in the 
sun works in such a way. A salient feature of building blocks is that they have 
characteristic sizes. I know of no manifestly complex system that is constructed from 
scale invariant blocks.   
 
Basically all progress in science has come from being able to study systems by restricting 
attention to phenomena associated with a fixed scale, thereby isolating a given 
characteristic type of building block whose interactions can be studied using an 
appropriate effective theory at that scale. In fact, the compartmentalization of science into 
a large number of separate sub-disciplines, such as particle, nuclear, atomic and 
molecular physics, are a direct consequence of this property of nature. The question is: to 
what extent can complexity be understood by taking this approach?    
 
To think on this further, let’s return to human languages. Certainly, languages are 
associated with a hierarchy of building blocks. The most basic, in written language, is the 
letter, followed by syllable, then word, then phrase, then sentence, then paragraph etc. 
These different building blocks are certainly associated with characteristic sizes. The 
sizes of words and sentences certainly do not follow power law distributions. A 
characteristic of language then is the existence of non-trivial structure on many different 
scales, each scale being associated with a different effective degree of freedom or 
building block. Can we now argue that the presence of a hierarchy of building blocks 
with characteristic scales is a sufficient condition for complexity? Certainly, this seems to 
be a much more discriminating criterion than “many degrees of freedom”, or “non-linear 
interactions”, or “Edge of Chaos”. But is it enough? Certainly biological systems and 
human languages exhibit such hierarchies. What about other systems?  
 
Most people would not consider a hydrogen atom to be a complex system. A hydrogen 
atom is a bound state of a proton and an electron. The proton is, in its turn, a bound state 
of quarks. Perhaps, these in their turn are low energy excitations of a more fundamental 
degree of freedom, such as a string or a membrane. So, even at the level of the lowly 
hydrogen atom, there exists a hierarchy of building blocks. Are building block hierarchies 
a red herring then? In the introduction, I mentioned that, although many degrees of 
freedom and non-linear interactions in no way indicated complexity, they were associated 
with two important properties – what elements are things made of and how do those 
elements interact. We are trying to posit that complex systems are composed of 
hierarchical building blocks, but have hit the obstacle that some non-complex systems 
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also exhibit such hierarchies. So, we pose the question: Do these hierarchies exhibit 
similar interactions in complex and non-complex systems?  
 
 
5. Hierarchical interactions 
 
 
If we consider the air that you are currently breathing, it exhibits a hierarchy of effective 
degrees of freedom. It is composed of a set of mainly simple molecules, principally 
nitrogen and oxygen. These in their turn are composed of pairs of covalently bonded 
oxygen and nitrogen atoms, which in their turn are composed of a fixed number of 
electrons and nucleons of two types – protons and neutrons. The nucleons themselves are 
composed of a fixed number of quarks. Thus, in this system there is a hierarchy of 
effective degrees of freedom, or building blocks, passing from one scale to another. The 
air as a non-ideal gas in approximate thermal equilibrium represents the ultimate level of 
aggregation for this system.  
 
In terms of interactions, the energy scales that measure the degree of interaction between 
different building blocks are much higher at the level of quarks than they are at the level 
of nucleons, which in turn are higher than the electromagnetic interactions between 
nucleus and electrons, which in their turn are higher than the covalent interaction between 
the atoms that make a molecule, while the Van der Waals interactions between the 
molecules themselves are even weaker still. Thus, the interaction strength systematically 
weakens as we go to larger scales. Put another way, it is easier to separate two nitrogen 
molecules, than two oxygen atoms, while separating the electrons is even harder and the 
nucleons even more so. Interestingly, the interaction strength at the level of quarks in a 
nucleon is so high that they cannot be separated at all without creating new ones! We can 
also think of the degree of interaction in terms of the ease with which the system can be 
perturbed. Separating the constituents is obviously one way to do this.  
 
As another example, consider a spin chain, where, for simplicity, we take the spins to be 
binary valued, as in the Ising model, though any alphabet would do - 4 for the nucleotides 
of DNA, or 32, thinking of the English alphabet along with a space symbol and five 
punctuation marks. We consider nearest-neighbor ferromagnetic interactions so that 
aligned spins is the energetically preferred state. In this system there are two ways of 
characterizing the degrees of freedom – in terms of the individual spins, or in terms of 
domains as contiguous sets of aligned spins. Obviously, a domain can be simply 
represented in terms of the underlying spins. The same is true of a sand pile, where the 
analogs of spin and domain are sand grain and avalanche. In this case there is no 
hierarchy or, rather, the hierarchy is of “depth” two in scale – the domain/avalanche 
effective degree of freedom being composed of the microscopic spin/sand grain degrees 
of freedom. The domains/avalanches are building blocks for the whole system – sand 
pile/spin chain - but in between the micro and the macro there are no more intermediate 
layers. Of course, if we went beyond the above description, and considered how the 
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above abstract spins actually represent properties of atoms and that, again, atoms are 
composed of electrons and nucleons etc. then we would see a richer hierarchy.  
 
So, how do these hierarchical interactions differ from those of a complex system? 
Language clearly is also composed of a rich hierarchy of different building blocks. How 
do these blocks interact? What will be our notion of interaction strength? We can 
consider different complementary measures. We could for instance, just demand that the 
words in the system exist in a given lexicon irrespective of grammar or semantics, for 
example giving a fitness f to a word that exists and a fitness f’ << f to one that doesn’t. 
We could demand that the words obey the rules of grammar without necessarily being in 
the lexicon, such as occurs in nonsense verse. We could also demand that the words are 
fully consistent both grammatically and semantically, this corresponding to the lowest 
energy or highest fitness state.  
 
Let’s consider a famous sentence in English, from the point of view of a statistical 
physicist, not a linguist, I hasten to add. “The quick brown fox jumped over the lazy dog.” 
contains all the letters of the English, alphabet so we can see all the microscopic degrees 
of freedom displayed. This sentence is completely self-consistent, both from the 
grammatical and semantic point of view.  
 
We can note that there are certainly strong “interactions” between letters within words. 
“The quick brown ofx jumped over the lazy dog” doesn’t makes sense as “ofx” does not 
exist as a word in the standard English lexicon. However, it does make good grammatical 
sense if we accept “ofx” as a noun. Words are, in general, very sensitive to the 
introduction of noise by “mutating” letters. A mutation of “fox” to “fzx” leads to 
something not in the lexicon. However, a mutation to “fix” gives something that is in the 
lexicon. Indeed, different words have different degrees of robustness in the presence of 
mutations. For instance, the word “dead” is much more robust to mutations – bead, deed, 
lead etc. - than the analogous word “defunct”. It is really the constraint that a word is in 
the lexicon that makes the interactions between letters in a word so strong. The 
corresponding fitness landscape for letter combination is rugged but not random as there 
are preferred non-random combinations of letters that accord with the sounds that the 
human voice is capable of making. 
 
Passing now to words: any permutation of the sentence is fine if we are only concerned 
with having words in the lexicon. In this case there are no interactions between the 
words. However, the constraints of grammar induce interactions between them. Thus, if 
we think of grammatical correctness as a measure of fitness then: “The quick, brown 
jumped fox over the lazy dog.” is of lower fitness than the original sentence as the 
placement of the verb “jumped” is grammatically incorrect, thereby indicating that the 
fitness of the sentence is sensitive to the order of the words. On the other hand, the 
permutation: “The lazy dog jumped over the quick, brown fox.” is perfectly fine 
grammatically, though it does sound a little counterintuitive, while “The quick, brown 
lazy jumped over the dog fox.” makes no sense as we have only a string of adjectives in 
the place of the subject of the sentence.  
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There are two important points that emerge here: first, that there are different classes of 
words – nouns, verbs, adjectives, prepositions, articles etc. and second, that word position 
matters. The degree of interaction between two words in a sentence depends sensitively 
on both their type and position. Once again though, we must ask: Is this different to what 
we see in non-complex physical systems? After all, type and position often count for a lot 
in physics too. Back to our considerations of air! Interchanging the positions of two 
nitrogen molecules in the air makes no difference to its macro-state. Nor does 
interchanging the positions of an oxygen and a nitrogen molecule. However, if we 
interchange a neutron in one of the nitrogen nuclei with a proton in another, we now get a 
carbon 14 nucleus. This would make an important change in the energy of the nucleus 
which would affect its interactions at higher levels, though clearly it wouldn’t affect the 
macro-energy state. So, what are we missing? Or, maybe, language isn’t complex after 
all.  
 
6. Hierarchical Emergence 
 
 
Above, I argued that lexicographic and grammatical constraints could be viewed as 
imposing interactions between letters and words respectively. For words, grammatical 
considerations essentially restrict the interactions to phrases and sentences. Are there 
“longer range” interactions? Yes. And these interactions are associated with an important 
aspect of language that we have not much touched on up to now – semantics. We have 
assumed that our erstwhile statistical physicist is ignorant of any meaning associated with 
any particular symbol strings, even though he/she has been able to determine an 
extremely non-trivial structure with the emergence of many different collective degrees 
of freedom or building blocks. Semantics is to do with the map between a particular 
ordered sequence of symbols and an associated set of concepts. “The quick brown fox 
jumped over the lazy dog.” has a clear semantic meaning for any English speaker. This is 
not so for a non-English speaker. Thinking of both as statistical physicists however, the 
non-semantic statistical content is identical. So, can the semantic content be thought of in 
statistical terms? Yes. The semantic content is associated with a different set of 
correlations than those intrinsic to the letter sequences themselves – correlations between 
letter sequences and concepts. The sequence “fox” refers to an animal with a certain set 
of phenotypic characteristics. I would bet that the patterns of neural activity are quite 
distinct between an English and non-English speaker when presented with this sentence.  
 
Semantics induces interactions beyond the scale of a sentence. Consider:  
 
1. “The quick, brown fox jumped over the lazy dog. The dog woke up, 
startled.”  
 
2. “The quick brown fox jumped over the lazy dog. Please pick up milk on the 
way home from the office.”  
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In the first combination, both sentences are grammatically and semantically self-
consistent in themselves. However, the second sentence is also a continuation in the 
narrative associated with the first. For that reason there is an interaction between the two. 
For the second combination, once again, both sentences are grammatically and 
semantically fine. In this case though, the second sentence is completely logically 
separate from the first in a semantic sense and therefore there is no interaction between 
them.  
 
But now, having arrived at the scale of two sentences we begin to come to the crux of the 
matter, where we can see some property that human language, as a representative of the 
set of complex systems, has that other simpler systems don’t. The semantic content of the 
two sentences is a multi-scale phenomenon. What do I mean by that? Each word has a 
semantic content, as does each phrase and each sentence (and each paragraph, section 
etc.). If we think that every one of these building blocks has its own characteristic scale, 
then the full semantic meaning involves an integration across all these different scales. If 
we restrict our attention to the building blocks of any one scale without knowing how 
those blocks integrate into others at a higher scale then we lose the full semantic 
meaning.  
 
For instance, just looking at combination 1) above; at the level of individual words there 
are two nouns, 3 adjectives, one verb, one preposition and two articles. We can see that 
we are talking about, a fox (“Any of various carnivorous mammals of the genus Vulpes 
and related genera, related to the dogs and wolves and characteristically having upright 
ears, a pointed snout, and a long bushy tail.”), a dog (“A domesticated carnivorous 
mammal (Canis familiaris) related to the foxes and wolves and raised in a wide variety of 
breeds.”), the action of jumping (“To spring off the ground or other base by a muscular 
effort of the legs and feet.”), something that is lazy (“Resistant to work or exertion; 
disposed to idleness.”) etc. Looking at just the words we have no means to extend the 
semantic content to higher order building blocks.  In terms of phrases, 1) has four: “The 
quick, brown fox” is a noun phrase, “jumped” a verb phrase, “over” a prepositional 
phrase and “the lazy dog” another noun phrase. Irrespective of how these phrases are 
joined together as building blocks to form a sentence we can see that there is now new 
semantic content at this scale. The first noun phrase tells us that it’s the fox that is quick 
and brown while the last one tells us that it is the dog that is lazy. Apart from that we still 
don’t know who jumped over whom. If we go up to the sentence level of building block 
however now the ordering of the phrases tell us that it was the quick brown fox that 
jumped over the lazy dog. A similar analysis of the second sentence tells us that it was 
the dog that woke up and that its condition was one of “startled”. However, we can now 
do one further integration step and combine the two sentences together to understand that 
the dog’s waking up and startled state was a direct causal result of the fox jumping over 
it.   
 
To recap: what distinguishes language as a complex system isn’t just that there is a 
hierarchy of building blocks but, rather, the existence of emergent properties that depend 
on all levels of this hierarchy. Meaning is such a property that transcends any given fixed 
level of building block. It is present at every level to a given degree but at each higher 
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level a new integrated form emerges that depends on the lower levels. Thus, the meaning 
of a word depends on the letters that form it; the meaning of a phrase depends on the 
meaning of the words that it is composed of; the meaning of a sentence depends on the 
meaning of the phrases that constitute it. There is no meaning to a building block at a 
given level without having the meaning of its constituent lower level building blocks. It is 
this that I claim is a true hallmark of complexity.  
 
What about physical complexity? Biological systems clearly display hierarchical building 
blocks. Are they more like language or more like air? The case of language illustrated 
that it was not the building block hierarchy per se that was associated with complexity 
but rather how a particular “observable” – meaning – induced interactions between 
different levels of that hierarchy. I would argue that there exists at least one “observable” 
in biological systems that has the same property – “fitness”, thought of as reproductive 
success. With meaning I argued that it was manifest at every building block level, but 
became transformed passing from one level to a higher one. Clearly, with meaning the 
whole is not the sum of the parts, even though the parts clearly contribute. Fitness in the 
same way has a meaning at each level but, again, the whole is not just the sum of the 
parts.  
 
To give an example: start with a microscopic scale, that of the important biological 
macromolecules, such as DNA, RNA, proteins etc. These obviously contribute to fitness. 
There are many micro-events, such as mutations, that have important macro-
consequences, such as sickle-cell disease. There, a mutation alters the nature of 
haemoglobin proteins so that red blood cells form with anomalous sickle-like shapes 
which change their oxygen carrying capacity. However, the consequences are restricted 
in their scope. The sickle-cell mutation does not directly affect other body functions but 
does affect overall fitness as it reduces life expectancy in non-malarial environments. 
Essentially, cells with a gene with the sickle-cell mutation aren’t doing what they should 
and this can be reflected in a lower contribution to the overall fitness of the organism 
from the cell reproduction mechanism associated with those cells. This in turn can be 
reflected at a higher level by a lower fitness contribution from the red blood cells 
themselves, which, at an even higher level, can be thought of as a lowered contribution 
from the red bone marrow that produces them and even up to a lower contribution from 
the entire cardio-vascular system.  
 
Contributions to fitness originate in all building block scales, just as contributions to 
meaning do in the case of language. In fact, it is probably not too fanciful to think that 
meaning in language is closely associated with an analogous concept of fitness or utility, 
as would accrue, for example, from being warned by a companion of a risk, such as a 
dangerous predator. In more general terms utility can stem from many things: following a 
cooking recipe, building an engine or solving differential equations, even being 
entertained by a book.  
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7. The tyranny of physical law and the difference between 
“being” and “doing” 
 
 
Besides being characterized by a rich hierarchy of building blocks at different scales that 
interact in an integrated fashion, what else characterizes complex systems? Once again 
we return to the logic of what properties do manifestly complex systems exhibit that one 
does not tend to find elsewhere? In physics and chemistry we have worked within the 
same paradigm for nearly 500 years – that the world can be described by a state and that 
there is a unique dynamical law that evolves that state in time. What has changed over 
time is our understanding of that unique dynamical law, passing from the laws of 
classical mechanics to those of quantum mechanics and incorporating relativity. In fact, 
not withstanding the quasi-theological pursuit of a “theory of everything” one could 
sensibly take quantum electrodynamics as the fundamental microscopic theory from 
which just about everything up to terrestrial scales should be derivable. Biological 
systems in principle fall into this category. Of course, no one seriously believes that 
quantum electrodynamics can be sensibly used to understand biology. It is not facile, 
however, to ask why not? Am I hidden as a collective excitation somewhere deep in the 
generating function for quantum electrodynamics? Given that every atom that composes 
an amoeba has to obey quantum electrodynamics then it follows that the amoeba itself 
obeys quantum electrodynamics. The latter is sufficient to describe and predict the 
behaviour of individual atoms, but not the enormously complex dynamics of the huge 
number of interacting macromolecules that characterize the amoeba.  
 
But is it just a question of complication? For example, the energy levels of hydrogen can 
be solved for analytically – at least in the confines of an approximate model – the one 
particle Schroedinger equation. The energy levels of Uranium on the other hand cannot. 
However, numerically, the levels of Uranium can be solved for very accurately. So, what 
does an amoeba do that a uranium atom doesn’t? The question itself, in fact, contains the 
answer – the amoeba “does” things. An atom passively obeys Schroedinger’s equation, 
while a tennis ball passively obeys Newton’s laws. A cat necessarily obeys both - but not 
passively. A cat falling upside down will right itself in mid-air so as to land on its feet. 
Both cats that fall on their head and cats that land on their feet obey all the restrictions 
imposed by the laws of physics and chemistry. Clearly then, these cannot help us decide 
why we only see cats that land on their feet. They cannot be used to distinguish between 
head-first and feet-first cats. The point is, the cat or the amoeba have a huge number of 
potential internal states that are all equally compatible with the fundamental laws of 
physics. What is more, that internal state can change dynamically in reaction to what is 
happening in the environment. A word that can be applied to such dynamically changing 
internal states is “strategy”.  
 
Two competing strategies that falling cats can adopt are: “head-first” strategy and “feet-
first” strategy. As the former leads to more injuries and a lower survival rate, the latter 
strategy has been selected as a useful adaptation. What is a strategy in this context? It is a 
rule for updating the state of the system. The fact that different strategies exist means that 
there are different dynamical rules for updating a state. This also seems to be an 
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important characteristic of complexity in the biological regime: That a more adequate 
description of the system’s dynamics is in terms of both states and update rules or 
strategies.  
 
Is this phenomenon only present in biological systems? A wonderful illustration of it in 
an artificial life, as opposed to real life, context, can be found in Karl Sims’ [12] stunning 
work on evolving virtual “creatures” to do different tasks. What Sims did was to create a 
creature by combining a simple morphology, obtained by combining together a hierarchy 
of three-dimensional rigid parts – quite literally building “blocks”.  These building blocks 
were represented “genetically” as a directed graph, where each node in the graph contains 
information about the dimensions of the corresponding block and how it is joined to its 
parent block. A neural network was used as a brain that indicated how one block should 
move relative to another. The creatures were set a task – swim in a virtual sea, or move 
on a virtual surface etc. A population of such creatures was then evolved over time to see 
what strategies emerged for tackling the given problem. In Figure 5 we see a one such 
evolved solution for swimming. Go to 
http://www.archive.org/details/sims_evolved_virtual_creatures_1994 to see the 
impressive movie.  
 
                                                                          
 
 
 
 
What do I mean by this? The space of possible strategies for a given complex system is, 
of course, restricted by the laws of physics. For instance, humans cannot fly unaided 
because, among other things, we cannot generate enough lift without wings. But the laws 
of physics only bound what the possibilities are, not which ones are chosen or why. This 
is completely different to what happens for physical systems themselves. In that case the 
tyranny of the laws of physics is such that there is only one relevant update rule, either at 
the micro- or the macro-level. Thus, a molecule, a pollen grain or a baseball are all 
constrained to obey update rules that tells us what their state will be later given that we 
know it now. It is for that reason there is no meaning to the concept of adaptation in the 
physical world. Adaptation is to do with being able to adopt a new update rule (strategy) 
within a given environment.    
 
Physical systems only have to do one thing – “be”. There is no requirement that an atom 
evolve in order to survive in a hostile environment. When air is heated to sufficient 
temperature, the atoms that form the molecules in it will start to dissociate. The 
Figure 5: A virtual creature evolved 
for swimming in a virtual sea. 
This represents much more than just a striking 
visualization. Great care and attention went into 
this work to assure that all the elements of the 
simulation were physically sound, i.e. that both 
internal movement and movement through the 
media were all completely consistent with the 
dynamics of rigid bodies in viscous media or in a 
gravitational field. Why do I take pains to 
emphasize this? Because the results of this 
simulation - the evolution of fitter and fitter 
organisms adapted to a given environment – 
cannot be understood in terms of the laws of 
physics     
 15 
molecules do not develop an adaptation enabling them to survive in this hostile thermal 
environment. If we keep raising the temperature we will start to ionize the atoms, 
separating off some of the electrons. There is no possibility of an adaptive change in the 
atoms that enables them to stop losing electrons.  However, if it gets cold I put on a coat. 
The origin of this is that in human prehistory, those who could prevent heat loss by 
covering themselves would have higher survival rates than those who didn’t. Just as with 
the falling cats, there are two strategies – cover up and reduce heat loss, or stay 
uncovered and risk hypothermia. Unlike the atoms, a change in environment in this case 
can lead to more than one response.   
   
The emergence of strategy as a description of a complex adaptive system is a truly 
emergent phenomenon. But, where does it emerge? If we think of chemical evolution, say 
in the context of an RNA world, where, as an example, different RNA molecules can 
“compete” in the context of the enzymatic catalysis of a particular interaction, it does not 
seem very natural to think of the RNA molecules as having a “strategy”. At this level, the 
tyranny of the laws of physics is still manifest.  
 
As emphasized physical systems only have to do one thing – “be”. They do not have 
“choices”. Biological systems however do have choices, different strategies, all 
consistent with the restrictions imposed by the laws of physics. What is more, different 
strategies are often associated with different elements and levels of the building block 
hierarchy, all of them exquisitely choreographed by the requirements of evolution to 
work in harmony. 
 
This discussion naturally leads us to consider - what is adaptation? Does a population of 
RNA molecules “adapt” searching for an optimal configuration for catalyzing some 
reaction? We can paint this at another level, in the context of artificial evolution, such as 
in Genetic Algorithms or Artificial Life. In Genetic Algorithms, the relevant dynamical 
equations are almost identical to those long familiar from population biology, where a 
population of chromosomes evolve under the action of selection and genetic mixing 
operators, such as mutation and recombination. The equations that direct the dynamics in 
these systems is very familiar from physics and chemistry: Stochastic dynamics of 
Markov chains in the case of finite populations, while in the infinite population limit, the 
relevant equations are a set of deterministic, non-linear first order difference equations – 
fiendishly difficult to work with, but conceptually within the same paradigm as any other 
traditional “differential equation” based approach. But it is precisely such systems that I 
argue are subject to the “tyranny of law”. In the case of a Genetic Algorithm, the 
restrictions do not come from any physical requirement but rather the restrictions of the 
model itself.  
 
Is a Genetic Algorithm really adapting or, more provocatively, is population genetics a 
model for adaptation? In both cases the dynamics takes place in a space of states, but 
there is no explicit dynamics for any update rule. Rather, an explicit “fitness” function 
(viability in the context of population genetics) is used as a proxy for how well the 
system does. In Genetic Algorithms this paradigm has been successfully used in the 
context of combinatorial optimization, where there does exist a concept of “best” solution 
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and it is reasonable what a solution is rather than what it does. In the more interesting 
case of Genetic Programming, this is not the case, an evolved solution representing a 
computer program and therefore a solution that does something as opposed to just is.  
For these reasons I would argue that biological adaptation really should be thought of as 
taking place in the space of strategies and states, not in the space of states alone. In fact, I 
believe that adaptation cannot emerge from any paradigm where a fitness function has 
been specified a priori. 
 
 
8. “Specialist” vs. “Generalist”: Evolution as the development 
of multi-tasking 
 
 
A key element of biological systems then is that their dynamics is naturally described in a 
space of states and update rules. This, of course, is reminiscent of game theory [13]. In 
the latter, payoffs are assigned to individuals or groups implementing a certain strategy in 
the context of other players playing their strategy. A familiar example would be the 
children’s game “rock-paper-scissors”. For two players, a payoff of 1 would be given to a 
player playing rock, while 0 would be given to the player playing scissors. It is not clear 
how useful the game theory paradigm is for physical complex systems. First of all, there 
is the question of the tremendous number of possible strategies. Worse still, we have no 
idea in what space we’re working in. How can we talk about the utility of one strategy 
versus another when we have no idea about the possibilities? Imagine 3.5 billion years 
ago trying to wonder about how to assign a payoff to  “lion”, “cockroach” or “oak tree” 
as the analogs of rock/paper/scissors! How would one begin to even imagine the 
possibility that such strategies could exist? The only option that we have is to observe the 
discovery of certain regions of the space of possible strategies as evolution moves 
forward and infer their relative benefits from observation.     
 
We also have to address the question of strategy to do what? Game theory is usually 
couched in the language of one strategic objective, where there is a clear notion of 
winning or losing. One could argue that survival in an evolutionary context is a game. 
However, there is a very important difference between evolutionary survival and “rock-
paper-scissors” that can be couched in the following way: Really, an organism is 
involved in a vast number of games and has to develop strategies for all of them. It also 
has the pressure of having to do well in all these different games in order to have a high 
survival probability. An organism that has a successful strategy in almost all areas save 
one can still be fatally flawed, as the overall fitness of the organism gets contributions 
from the payoffs of all these different simultaneous games. 
 
For instance, an organism must play a “game” against potential predators, and another 
against potential territorial rivals, and yet another against potential mates. However, this 
is just the tip of the iceberg. Inside the organism its immune system is also playing many 
simultaneous games, with white blood cell and antibody “players” competing against 
invading pathogens for example. Some of these games are carried out in series and some 
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in parallel. Our immune system implements a strategy to ward off dangerous micro-
organisms. It can do this while at the same time, the brain and cardio-vascular system are 
functioning trying to ward off a potential predator for example. On the other hand, an 
individual cannot simultaneously fight off a predator and look for a mate. So, in some 
problems a “specialist” approach is taken – the heart pumps blood, the lungs transfer 
oxygen, the stomach digests food etc. – while in others a “generalist” approach is taken. 
The latter is the rule when there is no sub-system that can specialize, such as in the case 
of seeking a mate and warding off predators. A human can choose to do one or the other, 
but not both at the same time.  
 
The specialist approach allows for multi-tasking, a property that clearly lends a 
tremendous evolutionary advantage. Imagine if your immune system worked only by 
explicit conscious effort while you weren’t distracted doing something else! Evolution is 
very much a phenomenon driven by the development of abilities to multi-task. In the 
context of multi-tasking there can be many combinations of strategies that lead to more or 
less the same fitness with compensations between one element and another. The multi-
tasking inherent in biological systems is hierarchical in nature, with the goal of 
evolutionary survival being associated with an overall strategy that itself is composed of 
a number of building block strategies, which in their turn are composed of other less 
functionally complex strategies. In a dynamic where novel building block strategies can 
be combined at a higher level then it is possible to have an emergence of truly novel 
strategies that were not originally present. 
 
 
9. Functional and Structural Modularity and Building Blocks 
 
 
Above I emphasized that the overall evolutionary strategy of biological organisms can be 
thought of as being composed of a very large number of “building block” strategies that 
work together to give an overall one. These building block strategies however, are, in 
general, carried out in parallel not in series. This requires modularity, a manifestation of 
the philosophy of divide-and-conquer. Modularity allows for parallel strategy 
implementation and for specialized strategies. Thus, lungs take care of the fact that 
oxygen is necessary for cellular metabolism, converting fuel molecules, such as glucose, 
into biochemical energy, while the stomach and intestines take care of digestion of food, 
breaking it down into more easily useable molecular forms. To locate food sources, 
sensory organs are used, among other things, to process environmental stimuli, the brain 
and nervous system interpreting it and the muscles then being used to move to a food 
source. Each of these “modules” is highly specialized to a particular task. The cell itself 
also has its corresponding specialized modules all working in parallel – nucleus, 
mitochondria, centriole, vesicle, lysosole etc.  
 
Thus, in this context, a module is really just a building block where we can readily its 
function. It shouldn’t be surprising that there should be such a close relationship between 
building blocks as discrete structures and building blocks of strategies, a structural 
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building block in complex systems being associated with a particular function. In fact the 
modules are really just the effective degrees of freedom of the system. A characteristic of 
a complex system is that there exists a hierarchy of modules at different scales where 
modules at larger scales are composed of more microscopic building block modules. 
Usually, we think of effective degrees of freedom as being characterized as collective 
excitations, being composed of combinations of the microscopic degrees of freedom. 
Here, I am saying that this hierarchy can and should also be thought of in terms of what 
the effective degrees of freedom “do”, i.e., the strategy that they represent. A strategy at a 
higher level is then an emergent phenomenon that results from a combination of 
strategies at a lower level. Imagine a system and two strategies – A and B – that both 
enhance the fitness of the system. The question then is: Is it better to spend some time 
doing A and some time doing B? Or to develop the capacity to carry out both 
simultaneously by modularizing and using part of the system to do one and part the 
other? The evidence from biology is that there is no uniform answer, as examples of both 
occur, but that it is clearly the case that with base level functions, such as respiration, 
metabolism, excretion, reproduction, temperature control, immune response etc. the 
modular route is the only feasible one.   
 
 
10. Can we measure complexity? 
 
 
I have argued that, although manifestly complex systems are associated with a rich, 
emergent hierarchy of building blocks at different scales, this fact, in and of itself, is not 
sufficient to identify them as being complex. Instead, I argued that complexity was 
manifest in the special way these building blocks interacted and that this in its turn was a 
consequence of the system being required to fulfill a certain goal – give meaning in the 
context of language (symbolic complexity), and fitness in the context of biological 
systems (physical complexity).   
  
If complexity is to be a meaningful scientific concept, however, then it should be 
measurable, or at least related to measurable quantities. What measuring device could 
detect hierarchical interactions between building blocks across multiple length scales? 
One possible measurement apparatus that springs to mind is illustrated in Figure 5 and is 
in itself highly complex – the human brain.  
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Figure 5: Is this the only apparatus capable  
of measuring complexity? 
 
 
Someone with an intimate knowledge of Hamlet and the works of Shakespeare, and the 
historical and cultural context of the play, would have a different neural response to 
someone who was unknowledgable on all those counts.  
 
So, does such “subjectivity” make a nonsense of using the brain as a measuring apparatus 
for language? Of course not! Measurement is to do with examining correlations between 
a property of a system and a property of a measuring device. One chooses a measuring 
device carefully for a given phenomenon so that this correlation is clear and readily 
interpretable and reproducible. In this context the brain of a non-English speaker is not 
that useful for measuring the semantic content of a text in English. Similarly, the brain of 
a non-Japanese speaker is not so useful for measuring the semantic content of a Japanese 
text. However, in both contexts the measuring apparatus, the brain, will respond. What 
differs is the nature of that response. The difference is that the individual measuring 
apparatus have been calibrated to respond to different signals – one to English and the 
other to Japanese. Is that so different to what happens in physics though?  
 
In Figure 6 we illustrate this by considering the case of two physical phenomena: boiling 
water and the electrical impulses of the brain as manifest in an electro-encephalogram. 
The two corresponding measuring apparatus are a thermometer and a voltmeter. The 
thermometer is an apparatus that has been calibrated to respond to temperature and the 
To be or not to 
be that is the 
question? 
Returning to the subject of language: Imagine that 
we take the sentence: “To be or not to be that is the 
question” and we use different brains to “measure” 
it. Of course, there will be a significant difference 
in the response between an English speaker and a 
non-English speaker that surely would be manifest 
in the internal configurations of the measuring 
apparatus – i.e., the neural states of the two 
different brains when presented with the sentences. 
However, it is not difficult to imagine that there 
would also be a difference in the responses 
between a native English speaker and a non-native 
English speaker, or differences due to cultural or 
socio-demographic factors.  
 
Why would there be differences? Due to two 
sources: non-semantic structural differences and, 
more importantly, semantic differences. The 
former is associated with the fact that an English 
speaker would recognize a coherent structure in 
the sentence irrespective of its semantic content. 
Beyond that, the differences in how different 
measuring apparatus react are more subtle, being 
associated with the present state of the apparatus, 
which, in its turn, depends on its past history.  
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voltmeter to potential differences. However, if we throw the voltmeter in the boiling 
water it will certainly respond! Just not in a way that has been calibrated and gives us the 
information we want or expect about the underlying system.  
 
 
Figure 6: Correlations between different physical phenomena and some potential 
measuring apparatus.   
 
The key property of the brain in terms of measuring structure and meaning in text is that 
it does so at multiple scales while simultaneously integrating information from those 
different scales. It does this by utilizing memory. Thus, the brain detects patterns 
irrespective of semantic meaning as, for instance, the sentient scientist sensitive to several 
significant sources of signal will notice in the alliterative tone. This ability to measure 
and integrate data across multiple scales using memory is what allows the brain to cope 
with the complexity inherent in the semantic content of human language and therefore 
measure meaning.  
 
It is important to distinguish between the hierarchical building block structure intrinsic to 
language that is independent of semantics, as measured, for example, in terms of 
correlation functions etc., and the extrinsic complexity associated with its semantic 
meaning, which is an implicit relation between the system, text say, and a measuring 
apparatus, a brain. However, as emphasized, different brains have different calibrations. 
Electricity, eeg 
good 
good 
bad 
bad 
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Of course, brains are plastic and can be recalibrated, in order to measure meaning in other 
languages. Is there anything else that can measure meaning besides the human brain? 
That meaning requires a complex measuring apparatus such as the brain is manifest in the 
difficulties of automatic translation. Below we see different translations of the phrase “To 
be or not to be that is the question.” as generated by an on-line translation engine. In 
order to test whether the system is generating any sense of “meaning” one would hope 
that its output from English to language X when fed in as input for translation from 
language X to English should return the same phrase, or a very close approximant.  
     
1) To be or not to be that is the question. 
2) Para ser o no ser que es la pregunta. 
3) Om te zijn of te zijn niet dat de vraag is. 
 
5) Because of a certain or because it is not, it is question?  
6) Because or it is not for the sake of, that having asked and being convinced?  
7) Being not to be for the sake of, or that that, you ask, are convinced?  
8) It is that without having for the sake of, or, you ask, are convinced? 
2) and 3), along with 1), form a closed cycle for Spanish and Dutch respectively. This 
happens because in this case a “literal” translation is possible, as the structures of the 
languages are sufficiently similar that a purely grammatical map in a single fairly simple 
sentence is sufficient to generate something that approximates the same semantic content. 
Rest assured this would not be the case if the full soliloquy was fed into the system. 4) is 
the translation of 1) into Japanese and 5) the output from feeding 4) into the Japanese to 
English direction. 6), 7) and 8) are further iterations of this process. Obviously, an 
unstable state has been reached!   
 
 
 
 
4) 
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11. Can we model complexity and is it the same as modeling 
complex systems? 
 
 
Let’s consider a simple mathematical model [14]: a group of point particles with position 
vectors ci and velocities vi and a force due to interactions with other particles which has a 
direction ||/ˆ iii ddd =  for the ith particle, where  
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The first term on the right hand side represents a repulsion between the particles, while 
the second term an attraction that tries to align their motion. The force is made stochastic 
by adding a small random number to it. The effect of the force is to align the direction of 
a particle with di.   
 
We can ask whether a simple mathematical model for point particles based on the 
interactions of (1) exhibits any of the characteristics that we have argued discriminate 
between complex and non-complex systems. There is certainly no manifest appearance of 
any of the symptoms, such as a hierarchy of effective degrees of freedom, or the 
emergence of strategy as a more meaningful description of an element of the system. On 
the contrary, the model seems to describe a very simple system with competing short-
range repulsion and longer-range attraction familiar in physics. However, equation (1) 
has been successfully used to model the dynamics of fish shoals! Now, no one would 
think that fish shoals do not represent a complex system, so how can this simple system 
model a complex system when we have argued that the model shows none of the most 
discriminating features of complexity? Maybe the criteria are too restrictive? What if we 
use the model to describe interactions between point particles rather than fish? Does the 
model still represent a complex system? If so, then there are many simple physical 
systems that we should now classify as complex.  
 
The resolution to this conundrum is the following: describing complexity is not the same 
as describing a particular facet of a complex system. The facet the above model describes 
is the mechanistic dynamics of how pelagic fish shoal, which just so happens to be the 
same type of model as describes how particles with repulsive and attractive forces 
interact. But fish are not mechanistic in the same sense as particles in a force field. Fish 
do many interesting things besides shoal. The above model cannot describe any of these 
other characteristics. Of course, it wasn’t meant to. The model provides a mechanistic 
description of a behavior, a strategy – fish shoaling. We can hypothesize, given the nature 
of the system, that the fish do this for a reason. That it has some evolutionary advantage, 
such as helping reduce the predation rate. Do molecules that can be described by a similar 
model employ a strategy too? Of course not. One could imagine other fish behaviors that 
might also yield to such a mechanistic description based on a simple model. Imagine that 
we could, in fact, do that for any fish behaviour. Would that mean that the fish were 
 23 
describable in terms of a set of simple models, one per behavior? Once again, of course 
not. Such models do not and cannot give us any insight into complexity or the notion of 
what is “complex” in a complex system. They can however, give us quantitative models 
of certain aspects of complex systems that, importantly, can, in principle, be compared 
with experiment. 
 
So complex systems can be modelled, in the above sense, but that does not mean we can 
model complexity. Is this possible? Well, we certainly do not have any existing theory 
that can do the job. What ingredients would such a model need? Well, for physical 
complexity, i.e. biological systems, first, it would have to be a model that worked at the 
level of strategies and states not just at the level of a unique dynamical law evolving a 
state. Second, it would have to function at a level where the strategies were not a priori 
known, nor was their payoff. This also has to be an emergent property. The systems that 
most closely approach this paradigm are agent-based systems, such as are used to model 
financial markets [le baron]. In such a case, one models strategies in a context where 
there is no explicit pre-specified payoff function. Rather, the success of an agent strategy 
is implicitly dependent on the strategies of all other agents, and therefore cannot be 
calculated until at a given moment of time all the other strategies have been specified.    
To understand these systems, except in the case of the very simplest strategies, such as 
random trading, inevitably, a simulation has to be run. Although such systems exhibit 
several features that I would claim are important to the development of complexity they 
also leave several important ones out. For instance, in such systems there is no building 
block hierarchy of strategies. A reason for this is that there is no real need for modularity, 
i.e. no associated multi-tasking.    
 
 
12. From symbolic to physical complexity 
 
 
I have used throughout as paradigms of complexity human languages and biological 
organisms. In section 2. I compared a text of human language to some texts of “genetic” 
language, posing the question of whether the latter was also complex.  It seems fairly 
clear that it is genetic language that leads to physical complexity through development. 
How then can such physical complexity be reached if the language that underlies it is not 
itself symbolically complex? As argued in the case of human language, this implies that it 
is complex from the demands of genetic “semantics” not genetic “grammar”. In other 
words strands of DNA, on their own, in solution, say, are not complex, just as Japanese is 
not complex for me, as I cannot measure the complex interactions inherent in it due to the 
demands that it have meaning. My brain has not been calibrated for Japanese. As stated, 
meaning comes from an interaction between a text and a brain understood as a measuring 
apparatus. What is the “brain” for genetic texts? DNA in solution has no meaning relative 
to its surroundings – the solvent. However, DNA in the context of a cell does have 
meaning, as is manifest by the complex activity of the cell. In this case the cell 
environment acts as the equivalent of the brain, a measuring apparatus giving meaning to 
what is written in the genetic texts. Once this meaning is established, then an action can 
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be taken, such as to produce a particular protein with an eventual macro-characteristic at 
the level of a phenotypic trait. This is precisely the genotype-phenotype map. 
Unfortunately, our understanding of it is minimal. 
 
So, in the cell there is an instruction booklet which needs to be read and, more 
importantly, needs to be understood. This instruction booklet exhibits a high degree of 
complexity in the context of a cell machinery that is capable of understanding it. These 
instructions are subsequently acted upon and this eventually leads to some phenotypic 
traits, which in their turn can be understood as facilitating certain strategies. Thus, in the 
case of birds, there are instructions for making wings and feathers and these allow the 
bird to implement the evolutionarily useful strategy of flying.  
 
 
13. Conclusions 
 
 
In this contribution I have given a very personal account of what I believe complexity, 
and the related notion of complex system, to be. Starting off with the premise that 
biological systems and human languages are definitely complex I tried to determine what 
non-tautological properties distinguished those systems from others. The idea was not to 
provide a rigorous definition of these concepts but rather see what phenomenological 
properties discriminated most. Properties such as many degrees of freedom, non-linear 
interactions and Edge-of-Chaos definitely do not discriminate. Neither does the more 
sophisticated concept of a hierarchy of effective degrees of freedom – building blocks – 
as a function of scale, as simple physical systems also exhibit such hierarchies.  
 
What does seem to distinguish the complex systems I consider is the property that there 
exist emergent characteristics – meaning and fitness – that induce interactions across 
different levels of building block and are such as to require an integration of the 
contributions from the different building blocks across different levels. This is quite 
distinct to physical systems where building block structure on one scale is effectively 
frozen out at others. It is for that reason that the physical sciences have been so successful 
when compared to the biological ones. In the physical world pretty much things are either 
homogeneous, crystals etc, or random, e.g. glass or a gas. It is the stability of the physical 
world that leads to a relative lack of diversity in structure and function. It takes a lot of 
energy to break up nuclei, atoms, molecules etc. For complexity we need to be able to 
construct a hierarchy of building blocks that is neither too stable nor too unstable. We 
need low energy to do that.  
 
We also need to avoid the tyranny of physical law. Complex systems were argued to be 
characterized more by what they do rather than what they are. Physical systems, on the 
other hand, are completely constrained, in a usually quite transparent way, as to what 
they can do. Complex systems however, are best described in terms of different strategies 
that they can implement. Put metaphorically - complex systems are verbs while physical 
systems are nouns. The tyranny of physical law is strongly related to the simple 
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requirements that such systems have to obey – find the state of least energy, or least 
action, for example. In contrast, complex systems are characterizable by a building block 
hierarchy of function wherein physical law acts only as a constraint to the possible 
dynamics not as an explanation of the dynamics per se as it does in physical systems.      
 
The escape from the tyranny of physical law has come about due to the challenge of 
evolving in a complex environment. This has driven systems to develop structural 
building block hierarchies that, in their turn, represent functional building block 
hierarchies. Each functional building block can then be tasked with solving a part of the 
puzzle of survival.   
 
The conclusion then is that one can isolate properties of biological systems and human 
languages that do seem to truly distinguish them when compared to any physical system. 
In that sense we can take these properties as characteristic of complexity and complex 
systems. Whether there are systems, other than the ones mentioned here remains to be 
seen. Of course, the reader may disagree with my usage of the word complexity as it is 
far more restrictive than previously used meanings of the word. It is, after all, just a word. 
What is more important than the word, is the set of properties that I have put under the 
rubric of this word, and our ability to measure and model them.  
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